Wednesday, March 12, 2014

On the pathetic status of Management Accounting.


I realise the value of a management accounting course in MBA programs as well as the value of hands-on experience in industry.

I started my career as an industrial engineer doing what are really cost management tasks, and later when I entered accounting academia taught mostly management accounting topics for the first five years. The time period  between my time in industrial engineering (1968-72) and accounting academia (1977-) was a transformative period for management accounting. 

First, all illusions of accounting in a manufacturing environment just about disappeared  from management accounting except for a lot of hand-waving about manufacturing. When I entered industry cost accounting was a very new term (it used to be referred to earlier as Factory Accounts, a relic of classic British understatement). Collateral to this was the dumping by management accounting of all aspects of factory accounts, such as cost engineering & estimation, project management, inventory management, and all accounting aspects of operations management,... These were precisely the  parts that were grabbed by industrial engineering. This transition was already underway when I started my career in industrial engineering. Those days I was happy because my then chosen avocation was becoming more attractive. Now I feel more ambivalent because the accountants lost important skills.

Second, management became a superficially scholarly field. Outright plagiarisation (I say so because it is questionable if the work shed any new light on our domain enough to impact practice)  of work in Economics on principal-agent models and statisticians' models of decision-making under uncertainty  did not really hold our interest except for a fleeting moment in history.

Third, we gave up modeling as a way of studying the property of operational systems. With this went the idea of rigour in  representation and careful attention to assumptions. We substituted them with impressive vocabulary. Since such modeling is the staple of engineering disciplines, they moved into what was traditionally our domain. Today, the most rigorous courses in cost/management accounting are to be found in engineering and not accounting. You put an industrial engineer even in a service operation and (s)he can be productive very quickly. On the other hand you put an accountant in a manufacturing environment and (s)he will quit in frustration soon.

Fourth, we moved our attentions up Bob Anthony's hierarchy from operational to management controls to finally strategic control. In this progression we also ascended to stratosphere in terms of vocabulary but not in the relevance to practice.

Today, if I were running any enterprise and had to hire a cost accountant I would any day prefer to hire an engineer with a good appreciation of costing rather than an accounting with less than rudimentary appreciation of engineering. 

Sunday, March 9, 2014

On banned Ted Talks.

Rupert Sheldrake is a biochemist, cell-biologist, and a plant physiologist. A past don at Cambridge, he is a Darwinist. I would not write him off lightly as some probably would.

True, there is some skepticism in science but probably not as much for its own good these days. And there is a tendency to make fun of anything not in conformity with "accepted" "scientific" theology. Perhaps science has become far too arrogant for its own good? As Sheldrake has observed,

"The idea came to me in a moment of insight and was extremely exciting. It interested some of my colleagues at Clare College – philosophers, linguists, and classicists were quite open-minded. But the idea of mysterious telepathy-type interconnections between organisms and of collective memories within species didn't go down too well with my colleagues in the science labs. Not that they were aggressively hostile; they just made fun of it. Whenever I said something like, "I've just got to go and make a telephone call," they said, "Ha, ha, why bother? Do it by morphic resonance!." (See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_Sheldrake).

 The problem is not that science has not claimed that it is imperfect, but that it often behaves as if only it already has the answers to any questions that can be asked. That is religion, not science. There was a time when science believed in flat earth or that humans are only a few thousand years old. And those who challenged the existing paradigm were condemned as heretics.

All scientists in history have had to cope with making peace between science and the possibility of phenomena that the existing stock of scientific knowledge is unable to explain. Newton believed in a monotheistic God who created everything. But when he seriously considered dropping out of studies to avoid ordination required for graduation. Fortunately for him, the statute was changed to provide dispensation from that duty. In his tome, Philosophae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, Netwon wrote:

"When I wrote my treatise about our Systeme I had an eye upon such Principles as might work with considering men for the beliefe of a Deity and nothing can rejoyce me more then to find it usefull for that purpose." 

Scientists such as Richard Dawkins, on the other hand, have made a different bargains for themselves. The main difference is that it was far more difficult in the old days to say something that would be regarded heretical. We should not make it difficult more difficult today for some one to say something that the scientists consider heretical, without compromising on the requirements of evidence (or proof).

I am not surprised that TED banned this talk simply because its allowing it publicity would be like some one publicizing Galileo when the church was against it. TED also has banned many other talks, including one by Nick Hanauer, a billionaire advocating higher taxes for the rich, one by Sarah Silverman for expressing a plan to adopt a retarded terminal baby, and Graham Hancock's talk about the transformative impact of the drug ayahuasca on him.

As long as the talk does not insult  one's intelligence or create social disorder I do not see why TED should ban any talk.

Thursday, February 20, 2014

On double-blind and triple-blind refereeing in journals.

Triple-blind refereeing would have been a great idea forty years ago. I am not sure it will work today for the following reason.

Some feedback on one's research well before the paper is sent to the journal is very important to most researchers. Most authors therefore publicise the paper in limited circles, say one's friends or a small social network of   researchers in the same area. Over time, this social network evolves around one or two very influential people (usually either politically active in the area, well connected, or editors/editorial board members). so, irrespective of the double- or triple- blindness of the review the review in reality tends to be far less than blind. Also, by the citations in the paper under review it is not very difficult for the reviewers to guess a very small set of people from which the author(s) must come.

I learnt the above very early in my career (I may have mentioned this in earlier posts). My first year out of PhD program I wrote a paper and included it in the school's list of working papers. I did not know that the school sent copies of working papers to all AACSB schools. A few months later I was horrified to find a citation to the working paper in one of the most prestigious journals in the field. Soon thereafter, I received a message from a wellknown academic in the area that the paper had good ideas and "let's work on it". I did not respond because the paper was essentially complete. A few months later, I sent the paper to another prestigious accounting journal for publication. My bad luck, the paper went to the same lets-work on-it academic. The review essentially said that idea was stale because the working paper (which included results in theorems/lemmata as well as their proofs) was already cited (the other review was a conditional acceptance subject to revision). I was, however, lucky in that the journal editor was open-minded enough to send it to a third reviewer, to break the tie, who accepted it also conditional on minor editorial changes. To date, it is one of my papers that has been cited in very diverse fields (Management Science, accounting, Operations Research, Finance, Space Research, Economics, Game theory,...), but hardly in accounting, even though the topic had to do with accounting.  Most fascinatingly, it was cited by some operations researchers who I do not know but were heroes of mine when I was a doctoral student in Operations Research.

Researchers in lesser known schools will ALWAYS be at a disadvantage because they are usually not in the tightly-knit small social networks whose membership is usually by invitation. This perpetuates the inequalities. These social networks are our equivalent of the one-percenters.  The rest of us peasants are the 47 percenters in their opinion. THE POLE OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH, ESPECIALLY IN ACCOUNTING, IS VERY GREASY, and those who reach the top are usually those who hang on to the coat-tails of those little social networks.

I do not mean the above in a disparaging way. Such networks perform a very important function: mentoring of recent entrants in the field.


I  always tell my doctoral students that the trick is to get into those small social networks as early as they can. Hard as it is to get into those networks, persistence usually pays off. I realise that this is a very cynical view of the world, but then I hate to have my students suffer.

One can hope that the growth of the internet  and the avenues for dissemination of research PRIOR to submission (such as SSRN, citeseer, arxiv.org,...) will provide some solace to the rest of us. On the other hand, much of such good research will get cited once or twice and then forgotten because of the pressures to cite people central to the area of research. The academic equivalent of rich-getting-richer. (In this whole post must apologise to the French Sociologist Vilfredo Pareto, the inventor of power law in the context of income distribution,  for stating what is clearly obvious; the world is mostly an implementation of power laws).

Wednesday, February 19, 2014

On Accounting and Finance.

It is the better developed theory that, in my humble opinion, differentiates Finance from accounting.

 When I started my doctoral program way back in the early seventies, finance was in its infancy. I remember taking my first doctoral finance seminar where the textbook was "The Theory of Finance" by Fama and Miller. The first part of the book (which is essentially elementary micro-economics with the time variable thrown in) was very beautifully organised, but the second part  where stochasticity in finance is added in, was vague, far too tentative, and thoroughly disorganised; the book essentially fell apart towards the end. At least it felt that way to me since I had arrived with a whole load of courses in probability theory and stochastic processes.  Finance theory then was just being refined, and Fama/Miller text had made a premature entrance. (I think Fama would have done better if only he had listened more carefully to his illustrious dissertation adviser, the late Benoit Mandelbrot).

Then for twenty years I had virtually no interaction with Finance until I was asked to teach a graduate course in Accounting Theory. A Finance colleague asked me to take a look at Luenberger's book on Investment Science (as the title suggests, it deals with only one aspect of finance). I found the book fascinating. Somewhere along the way, Finance had found itself. That can not happen without good theory.

Unfortunately, accounting, in my opinion, has yet to find its moment of epiphany. Until then, we all will be plodding along, pretending that we have a good understanding of our domain.

Monday, January 6, 2014

On Journal reviewers.

This is also an old post on another listserv, but not dated. It is an exchange between me and Professor Paul Williams of North Carolina State University. Steve (Kachelmaier) was the editor of The Accounting Review when this was initially posted, and Bob (Jensen) is the Jesse Jones Professor Emeritus of Trinity University.
______________________________
I have two basic comments.
The first has to do with the competence of accounting reviewers with minimal statistical (and econometrics) training passing judgment on what is essentially econometric work. The second has to do with Vernon Smith cite in Steve's letter. I state these two with no pernicious intent, but in a friendly spirit of intellectual inquiry. In what follows, I'll concentrate on the Vernon Smith cite.

IF I know Vernon personally and can vouch his integrity, then if Vernon says 11:03 I would take it at its face value, heavily discounting possibilities such as his doctoring his watch because he is hungry and we had a 11am lunch appointment, or that he wants to get rid of me for some reason and his 11am appointment with some one else is his alibi. In case of journal submissions with blind reviews, one can not discount such possibilities if Pons-Fleishman situation is to be avoided at all costs.
The point I am making is that with time we all can agree with the US time server as the arbiter, and so avoid calibration issues. On the other hand, with most empirical social sciences, the sampling problem is somewhat like the Turing's Halting problem in computation; it is undecidable. That being the case, in case of most "empirical" work in accounting replication with more, different, or different regime data must be encouraged. Ignorance is no bliss, and we do not know how many Pons-Fleishman situations exist in accounting.
Laws in the social sciences hold only in a probabilistic sense, the reviewers' acceptance decisions are point estimates of such probabilities. In no science do you accept probability numbers based on a single (or two) estimate. If Steve thinks so he must provide arguments. His communitarian argument holds no water in this context. In the social science, truth is socially constructed, but truth values are physically obtained.
Regards,
Jagdish S. Gangolly
Reply from Paul Williams:
Bob and Jagdish,
I pretty much exhausted myself debating with Steve before. Talking to a wall is productive only for someone who is insane and, believing I'm not there yet, I have given up on him. Steve simply doesn't hear you.
Jagdish, your observation about accountants' pretensions to econometric rectitude are well said. In this vein I would suggest that Bob add to the list of references an excellent article by Jon Elster, "Excessive Ambitions," Capitalism and Society, 4(2), 2009, Article 1. The article takes to takes to task the "excessive ambitions" of the social sciences as quantitative sciences. One section is devoted to data analysis. He observes about social science empirical work: "In the absence of substantive knowledge -- whether mathematical or causal -- the mechanical search for correlations can produce nonsense. I suggest that a non-negligible part of empirical social science consists of half-understood statistical theory applied to half- assimilated empirical material (emphasis in the original)."
He goes on to describe a study done by David Freedman, a statistician who selected six research papers from among the American Political Science Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and American Sociological Review and analyzed them for statistical errors of all kinds. Needless to say they were loaded with them to the point of being meaningless.
This is reminiscent of our days at Florida State University when Ron Woan (with a masters in stat and 11 years at U of Ill. as a statistics consultant) would conclude every seminar with a devastating deconstruction of the statistical flaws in every paper. The issue goes well beyond simply replication -- what point is there to replication of studies that are nonsense to start with.
This kind of academic community, as Elster concludes, doesn't just produce useless research, but harmful research. In 40 years of "rigorous" empirical accounting research we have not produced anything that meets even minimal standards of "evidence." One comment Elster made that would really piss of Steve: "Let me conclude on this point by exploring a conjecture alluded to earlier: we may learn more about the world by reading medium- prestige journals than by reading high-prestige and low-prestige journals."
Amen to that.
Paul Williams
North Carolina State University

On Deidre McCloskey, John Hicks, Ronald Fisher, W. Gosset, and Karl Pearson.

What a wonderful speaker Deidre McCloskey! Reminded me of JR Hicks who also was a stammerer. For an economist, I was amazed by her deep and remarkable understanding of statistics. 

It was nice to hear about Gossett, perhaps the only human being who got along well with both Karl Pearson and R.A. Fisher, getting along with the latter itself a Herculean feat.

Gosset was helped in the mathematical derivation of small sample theory by Karl Pearson, he did not appreciate its importance, it was left to his nemesis R.A. Fisher. It is remarkable that he could work with these two giants who couldn't stand each other.

In later life Fisher and Gosset parted ways in that Fisher was a proponent of randomization of experiments while Gosset was a proponent of systematic planning of experiments and in fact proved decisively that balanced designs are more precise, powerful and efficient compared with Fisher's randomized experiments (see http://sites.roosevelt.edu/sziliak/files/2012/02/William-S-Gosset-and-Experimental-Statistics-Ziliak-JWE-2011.pdf )

I remember my father (who designed experiments in horticulture for a living) telling me the virtues of balanced designs at the same time my professors in school were extolling the virtues of randomisation.

In Gosset we also find seeds of Bayesian thinking in his writings.

While I have always had a great regard for Fisher (visit to the tree he planted at the Indian Statistical Institute in Calcutta was for me more of a pilgrimage), I think his influence on the development of statistics was less than ideal.

Statistics and Philosophy.

This is an old exchange between me and Professor David Johnstone (Editor of the Australian journal Abacus). I am posting it here because it is still not dated:

Jagdish:

Your call for a dialogue between statistics and philosophy of science is very timely, and extremely important considering the importance that statistics, both in its probabilistic and non-probabilistic incarnations, has gained ever since the computational advances of the past three decades or so. Let me share a few of my conjectures regarding the cause of this schism between statistics and philosophy, and consider a few areas where they can share in mutual reflection. However, reflection in statistics, like in accounting of late and unlike in philosophy, has been on short order for quite a while. And it is always easier to pick the low hanging fruit. Albert Einstein once remarked, ""I have little patience with scientists who take a board of wood, look for the thinnest part and drill a great number of holes where drilling is easy".

1.
Early statisticians were practitioners of the art, most serving as consultants of sorts. Gosset worked for Guiness, GEP Box did most of his early work for Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), Fisher worked at Rothamsted Experimental Station, Loeve was an actuary at University of Lyon... As practitioners, statisticians almost always had their feet in one of the domains in science: Fisher was a biologist, Gossett was a chemist, Box was a chemist, ... Their research was down to earth, and while statistics was always regarded the turf of mathematicians, their status within mathematics was the same as that of accountants in liberal arts colleges today, slightly above that of athletics. Of course, the individuals with stature were expected to be mathematicians in their own right.
All that changed with the work of Kolmogorov (1933, Moscow State, http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~bskyrms/bio/readings/kolmogorov_theory_of_probability_small.pdf), Loeve (1960, Berkeley), Doob(1953, Illinois), and Dynkin(1963, Moscow State and Cornell). They provided mathematical foundations for earlier work of practitioners, and especially Kolmogorov provided axiomatic foundations for probability theory. In the process, their work unified statistics into a coherent mass of knowledge. (Perhaps there is a lesson here for us accountants). A collateral effect was the schism in the field between the theoreticians and the practitioners (of which we accountants must be wary) that has continued to this date. We can see a parallel between accounting and statistics here too.

2.
Early controversies in statistics had to do with embedding statistical methods in decision theory (Fisher was against, Neyman and Pearson were for it), and whether the foundations for statistics had to be deductive or inductive (frequentists were for the former, Bayesians were for the latter). These debates were not just technical, and had underpinnings in philosophy, especially philosophy of mathematics (after all, the early contributors to the field were mathematicians: Gauss, Fermat, Pascal, Laplace, deMoivre, ...). For example, when the Fisher-Neyman/Pearson debates had ranged, Neyman was invited by the philosopher Jakko Hintikka to write a paper for the journal Synthese ( "Frequentist probability and Frequentist statistics", 1977).

3.
Since the early statisticians were practitioners, their orientation was usually normative: in sample theory, regression, design of experiments,.... The mathematisation of statistics and later work of people like Tukey, raised the prominence of descriptive (especially axiomatic) in the field. However, the recent developments in datamining have swung the balance again in favour of the normative.
4. Foundational issues in statistics have always been philosophical. And treatment of probability has been profoundly philosophical (see for example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability_interpretations).

Regards,
Jagdish

 Reply from David Johnstone:
Dear Jagdish, as usual your knowledge and perspectives are great to read.
In reply to your points:
(1) the early development of statistics by Gossett and Fisher was as a means to an end, i.e. to design and interpret experiments that helped to resolve practical issues, like whether fertilizers were effective and different genetic strains of crops were superior. This left results testable in the real world laboratory, by the farmers, so the pressure to get it right rather than just publish was on. Gossett by the way was an old fashioned English scholar who spent as much time fishing and working in his workshop as doing mathematics. This practical bent comes out in his work.
(2) Neman’s effort to make statistics “deductive” was always his weak point, and he went to great lengths to evade this issue. I wrote a paper on Neyman’s interpretations of tests, as in trying to understand him I got frustrated by his inconsistency and evasiveness over his many papers. In more than one place, he wrote that to “accept” the null is to “act as if it is true”, and to reject it is to “act as if it is false”. This is ridiculous in scientific contexts, since to act as if something is decided 100% you would never draw another sample - your work would be done on that hypothesis.
(3) On the issue of normative versus descriptive, as in accounting research, Harold Jeffreys had a great line in his book, “he said that if we observe a child add 2 and 2 to get 5, we don’t change the laws of arithmetic”. He was very anti learning about the world by watching people rather than doing abstract theory. BTW I own his personal copy of his 3rd edition. A few years ago I went to buy this book on Bookfinder, and found it available in a secondhand bookshop in Cambridge. I rand them instantly when I saw that they said whose book it was, and they told me that Mrs Jeffreys had just died and Harold’s books had come in, and that the 1st edition was sold the day before.
(4) I adore your line that “Foundational issues in statistics have always been philosophical”. .... So must they be in accounting, in relation to how to construct income and net assets measures that are sound and meaningful. Note however that just because we accept something needs philosophical footing doesn’t mean that we will find or agree on that footing. I recently received a comment on a paper of mine from an accounting referee. The comment was basically that the effect of information on the cost of capital “could not be revealed by philosophy” (i.e. by probability theory etc.). Rather, this is an empirical issue. Apart from ignoring all the existing theory on this matter in accounting and finance, the comment is symptomatic of the way that “empirical findings” have been elevated to the top shelf, and theory, or worse, “thought pieces”, are not really science. There is so much wrong with this extreme but common view, including of course that every empirical finding stands on a model or a priori view. Indeed, remember that every null hypothesis that was ever rejected might have been rejected because the model (not the hypothesis) was wrong. People naively believe that a bad model or bad experimental design just reduces power (makes it harder to reject the null) but the mathematical fact is that it can go either way, and error in the model or sample design can make rejection of the null almost certain.
Thank you for your interesting thoughts Jagdish,
David