No matter which way you look at it,
tenure is a political process, and so it perpetuates the political
astuteness of senior faculty (unless, of course the culture of the place
makes the process apolitical). After all, the tenured are those who
have been astute enough to play the right tune to please the committees.
This holds irrespective of whether the university is "liberal", as some
would allege, or "conservative" as some can be (believe me, there are
plenty of those too).
I served on the tenure committees at SUNY Albany, and as department chair I had to put faculty up for tenure and defend my decisions before the tenure committees as well as the deans. Having worked with programs involving more than a dozen departments (from over half a dozen schools) across the campus my experience was that the quality of the tenure candidates, be they liberal or conservative, are strictly a function of the quality of "senior" faculty. Mediocre senior faculty perpetuate mediocrity, and meritocratic senior faculty perpetuate meritocracy. Both mediocrity and meritocracy are self-perpetuating. This means every tenure case is crucial, and even a very few poor tenure decisions can sink the culture and the reputation of any department.
Having served at many universities, my experience also has been that business schools, especially in accounting, almost always push mediocre candidates for tenure based on the argument that it is difficult to recruit without paying exorbitant salaries to incoming faculty. That, however, is a recipe for disaster and for long term sinking of productivity. There was a time when I advocated closing a department rather than following the convenient recipe, but then I am sure my colleagues suspected I was snorting something. (In fact that was the rule a long time ago even at SUNY Albany, which shut its Nursing school some time before I went to Albany).
If the tenure decisions are right, there should be no productivity problems provided the university provides a path for those at the tail end of their careers when the productivity is likely to taper (through administrative appointments). That was the presumed rule, at least until recently (Read Rosovsky's fascinating book "The University: An Owner's Manual"). Now, however, administrative positions in the universities have become an alternative career path with the tenure process serving as just an obstacle.
That makes a mockery of the whole tenure process.
In my ideal world, unless one acquired an administrative position at the tail end of one's illustrative career, one would lose tenure at appointment to an administrative position. This also will take care of the present situation where most senior administrators play the musical chairs in a game where no chairs are removed whenever the music stops, and so it is the same set of characters in the game.
I have serious doubts post-tenure review improves the situation because it introduces just one more political stumbling block, penalizing the most precious resource of productive teachers at the tail end of their careers: time.
The only way to solve the problem is to have a culture of productivity (not just in publications that no one reads) in the departments, and then to defend it as if the department's life itself depends on it.
I served on the tenure committees at SUNY Albany, and as department chair I had to put faculty up for tenure and defend my decisions before the tenure committees as well as the deans. Having worked with programs involving more than a dozen departments (from over half a dozen schools) across the campus my experience was that the quality of the tenure candidates, be they liberal or conservative, are strictly a function of the quality of "senior" faculty. Mediocre senior faculty perpetuate mediocrity, and meritocratic senior faculty perpetuate meritocracy. Both mediocrity and meritocracy are self-perpetuating. This means every tenure case is crucial, and even a very few poor tenure decisions can sink the culture and the reputation of any department.
Having served at many universities, my experience also has been that business schools, especially in accounting, almost always push mediocre candidates for tenure based on the argument that it is difficult to recruit without paying exorbitant salaries to incoming faculty. That, however, is a recipe for disaster and for long term sinking of productivity. There was a time when I advocated closing a department rather than following the convenient recipe, but then I am sure my colleagues suspected I was snorting something. (In fact that was the rule a long time ago even at SUNY Albany, which shut its Nursing school some time before I went to Albany).
If the tenure decisions are right, there should be no productivity problems provided the university provides a path for those at the tail end of their careers when the productivity is likely to taper (through administrative appointments). That was the presumed rule, at least until recently (Read Rosovsky's fascinating book "The University: An Owner's Manual"). Now, however, administrative positions in the universities have become an alternative career path with the tenure process serving as just an obstacle.
That makes a mockery of the whole tenure process.
In my ideal world, unless one acquired an administrative position at the tail end of one's illustrative career, one would lose tenure at appointment to an administrative position. This also will take care of the present situation where most senior administrators play the musical chairs in a game where no chairs are removed whenever the music stops, and so it is the same set of characters in the game.
I have serious doubts post-tenure review improves the situation because it introduces just one more political stumbling block, penalizing the most precious resource of productive teachers at the tail end of their careers: time.
The only way to solve the problem is to have a culture of productivity (not just in publications that no one reads) in the departments, and then to defend it as if the department's life itself depends on it.
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